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Opening Pandora’s Box:
Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects
of the Decision in Pupino
Eleanor Spaventa*
 
Constitutional issues arising from the ruling in the Pupino case – Court of Justice
holds that the duty of consistent interpretation applies also in relation to frame-
work decisions – Analysis of the extent to which the doctrine of consistent
interpretation can (and should) be transposed to the area of police and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters – Consequences for possible extension of other con-
stitutional doctrines elaborated in the context of the first pillar to the third pillar –
Extent to which third pillar acts can become a vehicle for the enforceability of
fundamental rights as general principles of Union law – The possibility of invok-
ing Francovich damages for breaches of Union law – To what extent can the
Pupino reasoning be extended to the second pillar?
In June 2005, the European Court of Justice held that national courts have a duty
to interpret national law insofar as possible in conformity with framework deci-
sions. In order to reach its conclusions, the Court extended first pillar doctrines to
the ambit of the third pillar. Whilst one can well agree with both the reasoning
and the result reached by the Court, this cross-pillarisation opens up a new range
of constitutional questions, from the true relationship between third (and second)
pillar instruments with national law, to issues of fundamental rights protection,
democratic accountability, judicial protection and so on. If those questions echo
familiar debates that have already taken place in the context of the first pillar, the
very subject-matter of law-making in the third pillar renders the debate much
more complex: our perception of the legitimacy of criminal law is inherently in-
fluenced by a ‘national’ mode of thinking, whereby the State’s power to impose
and execute criminal sanctions is seen both as being at the very core of sovereignty,
and to be the area where democratic and judicial scrutiny is most needed. Both
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these assumptions must be reconsidered when we devise the possibility to take
action in this area at Union level; and when such action is capable of producing
independent legal effects in the national context.
In this contribution, I will examine these issues. In particular, after having
recalled the peculiarities of the third pillar institutional structure, I will focus on
the effect of the Pupino ruling and in particular on its scope; on the extent to
which other Community law doctrines (and in particular fundamental rights and
Francovich damages) are applicable in relation to third pillar matters; and on the
extent to which the reasoning in Pupino can be extended to second pillar legisla-
tion.
The third pillar institutional framework
Title VI of the European Union Treaty, commonly referred to as third pillar, con-
fers upon the Union powers in the field of police and judicial co-operation in
criminal matters.1  There are four types of legal instruments that can be adopted
within Title VI: common positions, framework decisions, decisions, and conven-
tions. Furthermore, the Union can also enter into international agreements in the
fields covered by Title VI using the passerelle clause provided in Article 38 EU,
which allows the Union to use Common Foreign and Security Policy competence
(Article 24 EU) to enter into international agreements. Common positions are, or
should be,2  essentially political instruments: they define the ‘approach of the Union
to a particular matter’. Thus, and perhaps not surprisingly, the European
Parliament’s participation is not provided for in relation to those instruments, and
the Court’s jurisdiction is excluded altogether.3  Conventions are akin to interna-
tional agreements: thus, the Council merely recommends the adoption of such
conventions to the member states, and such adoption is in accordance with na-
tional constitutional requirements. Conventions enter into force when at least
half of the member states have adopted them, and their effect is limited to those
latter member states.4
1 See generally P.J. Kuijper, ‘The Evolution of the Third Pillar from Maastricht to the European
Constitution: Institutional Aspects’, 41 CMLRev. (2004) p. 609; S. Peers, EU Justice and Home
Affairs Law (London, Longman 2000); N. Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004).
2 See E. Spaventa, ‘Fundamental what? The difficult relationship between foreign policy and
fundamental rights’, in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations law: Constitutional
Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2007).
3 Art. 39(1) EU; according to the second paragraph of that article, the Presidency and the
Commission must regularly inform Parliament of discussions in areas covered by Title VI.
4 Art. 34(2)(d).
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Framework decisions are akin to directives with the difference that Article 34
EU specifies that they do not entail direct effect. Thus, they are binding upon the
member state as to the result to be achieved, but leave discretion as to the choice
of forms and method. Framework decisions can be used to provide for approxi-
mation of rules in criminal matters. In relation to rules relating to the ‘constituent
elements of criminal acts and penalties’ in the fields of terrorism, organised crime
and drug trafficking such approximation concerns only ‘minimum rules’.5
Decisions seem, at first sight, similar to the homonymous Community law
instrument but for the lack of direct effect. Thus, they are binding but cannot be
used for approximation purposes.6  However, and regardless of the confusing ter-
minology, decisions seem to be radically different from the equivalent instrument
in Community law: thus, whilst Article 249 EC expressly provides for an ‘ad-
dressee’ to a decision, who is the person or entity that is bound by it, the same is
not true for decisions adopted within Title VI. This difference can be explained
with regard to the lack of direct effect in relation to third pillar instruments:
however, it also suggests that decisions can have a more general (legislative) scope
than their sister acts in Community law.
Democratic accountability is limited in relation to both types of instruments.
The European Parliament has only a consultative role, which therefore excludes a
power of veto, and national parliaments can influence the substance of such acts
only in the pre-adoption stage through control of their representative in Council.
After a framework decision or a decision has been adopted, it is binding on the
member state without need for ratification by national parliaments. And, as we
shall see in more detail later, even though both instruments by nature need to be
implemented at the national level, they can produce legal effects even without
such implementation having taken place.
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is limited in relation to third
pillar measures. Direct challenges to the validity of third pillar instruments are
provided only for framework decisions and decisions, and standing is limited to
member states and Commission, thus excluding not only individual applicants
but also the European Parliament. Member states can also bring actions in rela-
tion to disputes as to the interpretation of any third pillar instrument (although
the chances of them doing so might in fact be rather remote)7  and the Commis-
5 Arts. 29, last indent, and 31(1)(e) EU.
6 Art. 34(c) EU.
7 Even in the first pillar, litigation between member states is a rare occurrence. Given the sensi-
tivity of the subject-matter covered by the third pillar, it is an even more unlikely event here.
8 Eleanor Spaventa EuConst 3 (2007)
sion is entitled to bring actions in relation to the interpretation or application of
conventions. However, the Commission cannot bring actions for infringement of
Title VI EU, including a failure to implement it correctly.
The Treaty provides also for the possibility of preliminary rulings in relation to
framework decisions, decisions and conventions. However, such a possibility is
conditional upon the member state having made a declaration accepting the juris-
diction of the Court (so far only 14 out of 25 member states have made such a
declaration);8  and the declaring member state can limit the possibility of making
a preliminary ruling to courts against whose decisions there is no remedy.9  Even
when the member state has made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court, Article 35 EU, unlike Article 234 EU, does not make the preliminary
reference mandatory for courts against which there is no judicial remedy.10  In any
event, the Court cannot review the validity or the proportionality of operative
decisions, i.e. of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement
bodies in relation to maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of inter-
nal security.
The character of the third pillar is therefore complex: the strong inter-govern-
mental component arising from the Council’s legislative monopoly; the exclusion
of any possibility for individuals and Parliament to challenge the validity of Union
acts in direct actions; and the exclusion of direct effect, is somehow tamed by
some supranational elements, such as the (limited) jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice and the immediately binding nature of framework decisions and
decisions. This hybrid nature of the third pillar then raises difficult questions as to
the constitutional effects of legal instruments adopted in the field of co-operation
in criminal matters. In particular, to what extent does the supranational compo-
nent of the third pillar justify the extension of the constitutional tools elaborated
in the context of the first pillar? The European Court of Justice recently addressed
this question in the Pupino ruling,11  the first, and so far only, occasion where the
Court has had a chance to explain the legal effect of framework decisions.
8 At the time of writing, and to the best of the author’s knowledge, all of the EU 15, except
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, have made a declaration pursuant to Art. 35 EU. Of
the EU 10, only the Czech Republic and Hungary have made such a declaration.
9 Art. 35 EU; Spain and Hungary have restricted the possibility to make preliminary references
to its courts of last instance, whilst the other member states have allowed all of their courts to make
preliminary references.
10 Belgium, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany,
Greece, France, Portugal, Finland and Sweden have reserved the right to make it compulsory for the
courts of last instance to refer the matter to the ECJ; see Council information concerning the decla-
rations by the French Republic and the Republic of Hungary on their acceptance of the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the acts referred to in Art. 35 of the Treaty on
European Union, OJ [2005] L 327/29.
11 ECJ 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino.
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The Pupino ruling
The Pupino ruling arose out of a reference by an Italian court enquiring as to the
interpretation of the framework decision on the standing of victims of crime.12
The case concerned criminal proceedings against a nursery teacher accused of
maltreating her pupils. The prosecutor requested the competent judge to allow
for evidence to be taken early on the ground that such evidence could not be
deferred until trial because of the witnesses’ extreme youth. The public prosecutor
also requested that such evidence be gathered under a special procedure, which
allows for evidence to be taken in specially designed facilities, so as to protect the
dignity, privacy and tranquillity of minors and possibly to involve a child psy-
chologist. However, according to Italian law, the special rules of procedure in-
voked by the prosecution were available only in instances of abuse of a sexual
nature. The national court thus referred the case to the Italian Constitutional
Court, enquiring as to the compatibility of the limited availability of the special
rules of procedure to crimes of a sexual nature with the right to equality and the
principle of dignity enshrined in Articles 3 and 2 of the Italian Constitution. The
Constitutional Court found that such a limitation was compatible with the Con-
stitution since the principle of equality was not breached by the regime, and, thus,
the principle of dignity could not be used to extend a special procedure, which
derogated from the ordinary procedure to be followed in taking evidence, to crimes
not identified by the legislature.13  Relying on the existence of the framework de-
cision, the national court then referred the case to the Court of Justice. The na-
tional court considered that it was bound by a Union law duty to interpret Italian
law in conformity with the framework decision on the standing of victims of
crime, which requires that victims should be treated with respect for their dignity
and that vulnerable victims are adequately protected. It therefore requested a
12 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in crimi-
nal proceedings, OJ [2001] L 82/1. On Pupino, see M. Fletcher, ‘Extending “indirect effect” to the
third pillar: the significance of Pupino?’, 30 European Law Review (2005) p. 862; J. Spencer, ‘Child
witnesses and the European Union’, 64 Cambridge Law Journal (2005) p. 569; R. Calvano ‘Il caso
Pupino: ovvero dell’alterazione per via giudiziaria dei rapporti fra diritto interno (precessuale penale),
diritto UE e diritto comunitario’ [The Pupino ruling: or on the judicial alteration of the relationship
between domestic (criminal procedural) law, EU law and Community law], to be published in
Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, available on <www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/
anticipazioni/caso_pupino>. And more generally, M. Ross, ‘Effectiveness in the European legal
order(s): beyond supremacy to constitutional proportionality?’, 31 European Law Review (2006) p.
476; K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, ‘Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy in invoking norms of
EU law’, 31 European Law Review (2006) p. 287.
13 Corte Costituzionale, Sentenza 529, 18 Dec. 2002, available on <www.infoleges.it>. The
Constitutional Court also debated whether the court’s interpretation of the rules of procedure at
stake was actually correct, or whether a more generous interpretation was possible.
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preliminary ruling as to the interpretation of some of the provisions of the frame-
work decision.
Before addressing the national court’s queries, the Court of Justice was faced
with a series of preliminary objections raised by the intervening governments. In
particular, it was a matter of contention whether the duty of consistent interpreta-
tion, according to which national courts have a duty to interpret national legisla-
tion insofar as possible so as to be consistent with Community law (especially
when the Community law provision is not in itself directly effective),14  applied
also in relation to framework decisions. The intervening governments relied on
the inter-governmental character of the third pillar in order to draw a distinction
between framework decisions and directives and to exclude the possibility of ex-
tending a first pillar doctrine to Title VI EU. Furthermore, they also relied on the
absence in the EU of a provision comparable to the duty of loyal co-operation
enshrined in Article 10 EC. Since the duty of consistent interpretation has been
based on the latter provision, which binds the national courts as well as the other
organs of the member states, and since such duty is not expressly referred to in the
EU, then, the governments argued, the national courts should be under no obli-
gation to interpret national law consistently with framework decisions.
The Court did not accept the reasoning of the intervening governments. Rather,
it drew on a number of considerations, literal, constitutional and teleological, to
find that the duty of consistent interpretation extended also to framework deci-
sions. Thus, it considered:
(i) The binding nature of framework decisions, which is formulated in iden-
tical terms to that of directives;15  and the fact that ‘it is perfectly compre-
hensible’ that the Treaty drafters should have considered it useful to make
provision for legal instruments with effects similar to those provided for
in the European Community Treaty.
(ii) The Court’s jurisdiction which, even if limited, would be deprived of
most of its useful effect if individuals were not entitled to invoke frame-
work decisions in order to obtain conforming interpretation in front of
national courts.
14 Consistent case-law starting with ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann.
The UK Government also raised the issue as to whether the principle of supremacy applies to the
third pillar; it conceded however that the duty of consistent interpretation might arise as a matter of
international law. We are not going to deal with the principle of supremacy since that would require
a lengthy investigation as to what that principle truly entails. The present writer is of the opinion
that supremacy applies since the principle of consistent interpretation is a manifestation of that
principle. However, the latter view is by no means uncontroversial. In this respect, see Dougan,
‘When Worlds Collide. Competing Visions of the Relationship between Direct Effect and Supremacy’,
to be published soon.
15 Cf. Art. 249(3) EC.
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(iii) The fact that it would be difficult for the Union to carry out its objectives
if the member states were not bound by the principle of loyal co-opera-
tion.
Having found that the duty of consistent interpretation applied also in the con-
text of framework decisions, the Court specified, re-iterating what it had already
held in the context of Community law, that the principle of consistent interpreta-
tion is limited by the general principles of Community law, and in particular by
the principles of legal certainty, non-retroactivity and by fundaments rights as
general principles of Union law. For those reasons, consistent interpretation can
never be used to establish or aggravate the criminal liability.16  Furthermore, the
Court also specified that the duty of consistent interpretation does not stretch to
(nor can serve the purpose of ) an interpretation contra legem and that, consis-
tently with what it held in Pfeiffer, in the context of Community law,17  the na-
tional court must consider the whole of national law to assess whether it is possible
to provide an interpretation which is not inconsistent with the framework deci-
sion.
The main constitutional question arising from the ruling in Pupino relates to
the extent to which principles elaborated in the context of Community law18  can
be extended to the third and second pillar. In this respect, the Court’s ruling
might be more far-reaching than it appears at first sight. In particular, we shall
consider the extent of the applicability of the principle of duty of consistent inter-
pretation; whether such duty might be a vehicle through which general principles
of Community law might become directly enforceable in the field of Union law;
the possibility that the duty of loyal co-operation also might entail a right to
Francovich damages for serious breaches of Union law; and the possibility that the
principle of loyal co-operation applies also to instruments over which the Court
has no jurisdiction.
The extent of the duty of consistent interpretation
The duty of consistent interpretation imposed on national courts in relation to
framework decisions, which is most likely to apply as well in relation to decisions,
is to be interpreted in a similar way to the same duty in relation to Community
law. In particular, and as said before, the Court has indicated that national courts
16 Cf. ECJ 8 Oct. 1987, Case C-80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen; ECJ 26 Sept. 1996, Case C-168/
95 Criminal proceedings against Arcaro. See also ECJ 3 May 2005, Case C-387/02, Berlusconi and
others.
17 ECJ 5 Oct. 2004, Case C-397/01, Pfeiffer and others.
18 Exception given for the principle of direct effect for framework decisions and decisions which
has said above is explicitly excluded by Art. 34 EU.
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should, in order to comply with such a principle, have regard for the whole of
national law. However, the duty of consistent interpretation is inherently limited
by the general principles of Union law, and it can never be used to aggravate or
create criminal liability.
The criminal liability proviso constitutes a basic safeguard for individuals: it
reflects both the general principle nullum crimen sine lege; the principle according
to which directives (and framework decisions) are addressed to member states and
are therefore not capable of imposing obligations on individuals; and the prin-
ciple according to which member states cannot rely on their own failure to imple-
ment Community law against individuals. In the Community law context, the
application of the criminal liability exception has not proven to be particularly
difficult nor particularly controversial. However, the transposition of the same
doctrine in the field of co-operation in criminal matters might be more difficult,
since the consistent interpretation in this field is more likely to centre on the
interpretation of criminal law. In this respect, the ruling in Pupino is an example
of the difficulties encountered in establishing a clear dividing line between what
aggravates criminal liability and what does not.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to recall the Court’s ruling in Berlusconi.19
In that case, the national court referred a series of questions concerning the com-
patibility of legislative amendments introduced by the Berlusconi government
with some of the company directives.20  Amongst other changes, the new regime
reduced the statute of limitation for offences of which the claimants in the main
proceedings had been charged. The alleged offences had taken place before the
new regime had entered into force. However, as a result of changes in the legisla-
tion, the proceedings had become statutorily barred. The Court reiterated its case-
law according to which a directive cannot have the effect of aggravating criminal
liability. Since the Italian criminal code expressly provides that the most lenient
penalty always applies in case of a change of legislation, the Italian court could not
rely on the directives. As said above, part of the national court’s enquiry related to
the statute of limitation, which is a rule of procedure. Whilst it is true that the case
was decided focusing on the most lenient penalty rule, a rule which might be
deemed substantive rather than procedural, the judgment also seems to suggest
that rules relating to the statute of limitation may not be affected by Community
law. On the other hand, in Pupino, the Court accepted, in principle, that the duty
of consistent interpretation could be used to affect rules on how evidence should
19 ECJ 3 May 2005, Case C-387/02, Berlusconi and others. On this point see also Calvano, supra
n. 12.
20 First Companies Directive 68/151, OJ [1968] L 65/8; Fourth Companies Directive 78/660,
OJ [1978] L 222/11; Seventh Companies Directive 83/349, OJ [1983] L 193/1.
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be gathered in order for it to be legally relevant in the proceedings.21  However,
rules on evidence are not in kind different from rules determining the time limit
for an action: both are procedural rules which in themselves neither create nor
aggravate criminal liability, and yet both might well determine the outcome of the
case.22  It is likely that the public prosecutor’s worries lay as much with the fact
that evidence gathered at a later stage might not be sufficient to convict Mrs.
Pupino, as with the welfare of the young victims. In that sense, whilst it is true
that rules concerning how evidence is gathered are not constitutive of criminal
liability, and cannot aggravate it, they might well determine the outcome of the
case, just as the rules concerning the time bar determined the Berlusconi case.
Whilst the Court’s different approach in Pupino and Berlusconi might well be
explained having regard to the particular facts of the cases, a comparison between
the two is useful to draw attention to the difficulties arising in determining which
rules aggravate liability and which rules do not have such an effect and can there-
fore be subject to the duty of consistent interpretation. It is true that the Court of
Justice clarified that in any event the duty of consistent interpretation is subject to
fundamental rights, including the need to ensure that the application of Union
law would be consistent with Article 6 of the Convention (as interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights). However, one could question whether appli-
cation of the duty of consistent interpretation to rules of criminal procedure,
which might result in a detrimental effect on the person charged of a criminal
offence, would ever be compatible with the guarantees afforded by the European
Convention on Human Rights, and with the principle of legal certainty and
forseeability that apply, at least to a certain extent, also to rules of procedure.23  In
this respect, it would have been preferable for the Court to clearly state that the
principle of consistent interpretation can never be used to the detriment of the
defendant, regardless of the nature of the rules in question (in which case the
Pupino ruling would have been of little use to the prosecution).
Furthermore, it should be noted that in relation to directives, the duty of con-
sistent interpretation arises regardless of whether the national rule at issue has
been adopted in order to implement a given provision of Community law; and
21 At para. 46 of the ruling the Court held that the rules at issue did not concern the ‘criminal
liability of the person concerned but the conduct of the proceedings and the means to take evi-
dence’.
22 See also Corte di Cassazione 15 May 2006, sentenza no. 1654, summary reported in Reflets
(2/2006), p. 21, also available on <curia.europa.eu/fr/coopju/apercu_reflets/lang/index.htm>; and
Calvano, supra n. 12.
23 Cf., e.g., ECtHR, Coëme, and Others v. Belgium (Appl. Nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/
96, 33209/96 and 33210/96), Judgment of 22/06/2000, especially paras. 142 et seq. on the appli-
cability of Art. 7 ECHR to rules concerning limitation periods.
14 Eleanor Spaventa EuConst 3 (2007)
indeed such a duty arises even when the national legislation at issue predates the
Community law provision in question.24  The national courts have to ensure the
full effectiveness of Community law insofar as that is possible through interpreta-
tion, notwithstanding the two exceptions concerning contra legem interpretation
and aggravation of criminal liability. If the duty of consistent interpretation is to
apply in a similar way in relation to framework decisions, this means that even
when a national parliament has failed, or refused, to implement a framework
decision, such a decision can nonetheless produce legal effects in the domestic
system. In relation to framework decisions, this might be seen as more problem-
atic than it is in relation to first pillar instruments, since in the case of the former
national parliaments so far have refused to give up their veto power. However, if
the duty of consistent interpretation can be of use even lacking any implementa-
tion of the framework decision, the national legislature’s monopoly in the field of
criminal law is significantly eroded, as are accountability and democratic scrutiny.
This would be all the more serious should the duty of consistent interpretation be
used to the detriment of the defendant, even if not to aggravate liability.
Finally, the duty of consistent interpretation also should be seen as binding the
courts in those member states which have refused to recognise the jurisdiction of
the Court. The application of Article 1 EU and of the general principles of Union
law cannot be made conditional upon a unilateral and voluntary act of the mem-
ber state. Rather, and as it is clear from the Court’s reasoning, the duty of loyal co-
operation, with the ensuing duty of consistent interpretation, is a Union law
constitutional principle and, as such, is binding upon all of the member states.
This fact, however, places national courts in those member states which have not
made the declaration pursuant to Article 35 EU in an uncomfortable position:
they have to give some effect to Union law, but they are unable to enquire of the
Court of Justice as to the true interpretation (and indeed the validity) of frame-
work decisions.
This said, the writer believes the Court’s approach to be consistent with the
principles informing the European Union, which, even in its more intergovern-
mental manifestation, is still radically different from a traditional international
organisation. And the duty of consistent interpretation is but an enhanced mani-
festation of the principle pacta sunt servanda, which through the medium of an
independent constitutional system is binding upon the national courts as a matter
of Union constitutional law, rather than national constitutional law.
It is now time to consider the extent to which other constitutional principles of
the Community can be transposed to the third pillar.
24 ECJ 13 Nov. 1990, Case C-106/89, Marleasing v. Comercial Internacional de Alimentación.
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The scope of application of fundamental rights as general
principles of Union law
I have argued elsewhere that the effects of Pupino are much more pervasive than
they seem at first sight.25  In particular, it should be questioned whether the appli-
cability of the principle of consistent interpretation could be relied upon to in-
voke fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, not only as mere
limits to consistent interpretation, but as directly enforceable rights against the
State.
As it is well-known, in the Community law context, the Court has imposed
pervasive fundamental rights obligations upon the member states. In particular,
the member states have a duty to respect fundamental rights whenever they imple-
ment or act within the scope of Community law. This obligation has been codi-
fied by Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,26  which, even before the
de-pillarisation effectuated by the Constitutional Treaty, provided that its provi-
sions were binding upon the member states whenever they implemented Union
law. The question is then whether, even independently from the Charter and from
the Constitutional Treaty, fundamental rights as general principles of Union law
are enforceable against member states. We shall recall first the scope of the funda-
mental rights review in the Community context, and then consider its scope in
relation to Union law.
In relation to the first pillar, the Court has made it clear that when the member
states implement Community law, their discretion is constrained by the general
principles of Community law, including fundamental rights.27  The case-law is
not crystal clear, however, as to the extent of such an obligation. If the Commu-
nity law provision is directly effective, then a national rule which falls within the
scope of the Community rule and which breaches fundamental rights must be set
aside. For instance, in the case of Carpenter,28  the Court found that a rule which
(allegedly) affected the claimant’s directly effective right to move could not be
25 E. Spaventa, ‘Remembrance of Principles Lost: on Fundamental Rights, the Third Pillar and
the Scope of Union law’, 25 Yearbook of European Law 2006 (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2007).
26 And Art. II-111, Constitutional Treaty (OJ [2004], C 310/1). The Charter is not ‘legally
binding’ but it is clearly legally relevant; it has now been referred to by the Court, ECJ 27 June
2006, Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, para. 38.
27 ECJ 13 July 1989, Case C-5/88, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und
Forstwirtschaft. The national legislature’s discretion also is constrained as a matter of national law by
national constitutional rights; and, as a matter of international law, by the European Convention on
Human Rights.
28 ECJ 11 July 2002, Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment. This is consistent case-law, e.g., see ECJ 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89, ERT v. DEP.
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applied to the facts of the main proceedings, since it was incompatible with the
claimant’s right to family life. In such cases, however, fundamental rights act as a
constraint to the discretion of the member states to limit a directly effective right.
What is applied, and what displaces national law, is the directly effective right
rather than the general principle.
In relation to non-directly effective provisions, the matter is less clear.29  How-
ever, a recent ruling seems to confirm that general principles can be directly effec-
tive even when the provision that brought the matter within the scope of
Community law is not in itself directly effective. In the case of Mangold,30  litiga-
tion arose between two individuals as to whether Community law prohibited
discrimination on grounds of age. As is well-known, the framework discrimina-
tion directive lays down a ‘framework’ to combat such discrimination;31  however,
that directive was not relevant since the time limit for its implementation had not
expired. Therefore, according to the case-law, the principle of consistent interpre-
tation was not applicable. This not withstanding, the Court found that the prohi-
bition of discrimination on grounds of age was a general principle of Community
law and that, since the legislation at issue fell within the scope of Community law
by virtue of another directive,32  such a general principle applied and was directly
effective even in a case concerning a horizontal situation, i.e., in a case where the
directive at issue could not have been directly effective.
The extent to which the Mangold case is a good authority is open to debate,
and one could hope that the Court will retreat from giving horizontal effects to
the general principles. However, the case is a further indication that general prin-
ciples, including fundamental rights, can be at least vertically directly effective and
therefore can be used to set aside national legislation, even when the rule which
has brought the situation within the scope of Community law is not itself directly
29 The confusion arises from the Wachauf formula, which seemed to indicate that in cases of
implementation, the national court’s duty was limited to a duty of consistent interpretation; how-
ever, later cases suggested that the fundamental rights obligation could be directly effective also in
relation to implementation of non-directly effective Community law; see, e.g., ECJ 17 Dec. 1998,
Case C-2/97, Societá Italiana Petroli Spa (IP) v. Borsana Srl; ECJ 12 Dec. 2002, Case C-442/00,
Ángel Rodríguez Caballero v. Fondo de Garancía Salaríal (Fogasa); ECJ 10 July 2003, Joined Cases C-
20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture ltd and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers.
30 ECJ 22 Nov. 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold. The case has not been welcomed by the schol-
arship because it introduces an element of legal uncertainty both in the identification of the general
principles, and for the effect it has on private parties; see, e.g., February 2006 editorials in the
Common Market Law Review and European Law Review.
31 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation, OJ [2000] L 303/13.
32 Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed term-work
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ [1999] L 175/43.
17Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino
effective.33  After all, if the member state is exercising discretion within the scope
of Community law, it is only right that it should be bound by the Community
constitutional system.
Following the ruling in Pupino, this reasoning could be extended to framework
decisions (and decisions). Thus, whenever a field has been occupied by a frame-
work decision, then the matter automatically falls within the scope of Union law,
regardless of whether the member state has taken positive steps to implement the
Union instrument. If it were otherwise, if national law was not falling within the
scope of Union law, then clearly there would be no obligation arising in Union
law for national courts to interpret their national legislation in conformity with
the framework decision. Now, if matters covered by framework decisions fall within
the scope of Union law, then fundamental rights as a general principle of Union
law must be relevant, not only as a limit to the national courts’ interpretative
power, but also as a yardstick against which to measure the member state’s actions.
In other words, once a framework decision has been adopted, as a matter of Union
law, the member state loses the discretion to regulate in a manner incompatible
with the general principles, in the same way as national courts lose the discretion
of interpreting national law or the framework decision in a manner that is incom-
patible with fundamental rights.
The open question is whether such fundamental rights obligation should be
enforceable against the State despite the fact that the Treaty expressly excludes
direct effect in relation to framework decisions. In the writer’s opinion, there is no
reason why that should not be the case. First, to argue otherwise would introduce
a constitutional fracture in the system, which would be difficult to explain and at
odds with the unitary structure of the Union, as well as with the general funda-
mental rights obligation contained in Article 6 of the TEU. In the context of
Community law, the direct effect of the provision which brought the matter within
the scope of Community law seems to be immaterial to the enforceability of the
general principles of Community law, including fundamental rights. It would be
peculiar if, in the field of criminal law, where fundamental rights scrutiny is all the
more important, the application of fundamental rights would be more limited.
And one could add that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is further evidence of
the fact that the institutions (and the member states) perceived such state of af-
fairs as status quo. Thus, the Charter binds the member states whenever they imple-
ment Union law, and there is no indication in the Charter that the direct effect of
the provision implemented is relevant to its application.
33 The situation is much more complex in relation to directives providing for minimum harmo-
nization; for an excellent critical analysis see F. De Cecco, ‘Room to move? Minimum harmoniza-
tion and fundamental rights’, 43 CMLRev. (2003) p. 9.
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Secondly, member states are in any event bound, in the exercise of their discre-
tion, and as a matter of national law, by their constitutional fundamental rights,34
as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights. The direct effect of
Union fundamental rights simply would guarantee effective (and in some instances
more speedy) protection.35  Furthermore, it should be noted that in such cases,
there is no space for a conflict over the possible level of fundamental rights protec-
tion: when a member state is exercising discretion within the scope of Union law,
and to the extent to which that is compatible with Union law, it is the highest
standard of fundamental rights that applies. In other words, if the general prin-
ciples provide for a higher standard of protection than constitutional law, then the
member state is under a duty to respect the higher Union law standard. If, on the
other hand, it is constitutional law that provides a higher standard of protection,
and the member state has discretion, then, as a matter of national law, it will be
under an obligation to exercise that discretion consistently with fundamental rights
as protected in its own system.36  The problem of possible differing standards, a
real problem when considering the validity of Union (including Community)
law, therefore does not arise in these cases.
The possibility of invoking Francovich damages
The applicability of the principle of loyal co-operation to framework decisions
raises the important question of the possibility of extending Francovich damages
to sufficiently serious breaches of Union law, and in particular, to cases in which
individuals suffer damages from the non-implementation of framework decisions.
After all, Francovich damages might well enhance both the effectiveness and the
uniformity of Union law by imposing a financial incentive upon the member
states to comply with the obligations undertaken at Union level. However, it should
be queried whether the extension of the principle of State liability to the third
pillar is constitutionally consistent as well as practically workable or useful.
34 E.g., see the German Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgericht, 18/7/05, 2 BvR 2236/
04; as reported on <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/bverfg_cgi/pressemitteilungen/frames/bvg05-
064e.html> on the incompatibility with the German Constitution of the law implementing the
Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant.
35 For a more extensive analysis of this issue, see Spaventa, supra n. 25. Of course there is an open
issue as to whether the principle of supremacy applies to the Union as well as to the Community; see
D. Curtin and I. Dekker, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections
on Vertical Unity-in-Diversity’, in P. Beaumont et al. (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European
Public Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) esp. at p. 68-69.
36 Cf. the German Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgericht, 18/7/05, 2 BvR 2236/04; as
reported on <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/bverfg_cgi/pressemitteilungen/frames/bvg05-
064e.html> on the incompatibility with the German Constitution of the law implementing the
Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant.
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In order to establish the principle of State liability for breaches of Community
law, the Court in Francovich relied on the following considerations.37  First, the
E(E)C Treaty had created its own legal system, integrated in the legal systems of
the member states and which national courts are bound to apply. Such a system
also is intended to grant rights to individuals, not only when such rights are ex-
pressly granted by the Treaty but also by virtue of ‘obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined manner both on individuals and on the member
states and the Community institutions.’ Secondly, national courts must ensure
the full effectiveness of Community law, and must protect the rights conferred on
individuals. Thirdly, the effectiveness of Community law would be weakened if
individuals were not able to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a
member state’s breach of Community law. This is particularly the case when the
full effectiveness of Community law is conditional upon prior action by the mem-
ber state, and therefore individuals cannot enforce their rights in absence of such
action. Finally, in order to reinforce its reasoning, the Court relied on Article 10
EC, i.e., on the principle of loyal co-operation.
Now, it seems that, following the Pupino ruling, the latter three considerations
can be extended to breaches of Union law, at least those resulting from non-
compliance with a framework decision/decision. Thus, the principle of loyal co-
operation applies also to the third pillar; national courts clearly must ensure the
effectiveness of Union law, since otherwise they would not be bound by the duty
of consistent interpretation;38  and, in the third pillar, the possibility of relying on
rights conferred by Union law is always conditional upon action of the member
states since third pillar instruments cannot have direct effect. Thus, the Court’s
considerations based on the effectiveness of Community law, and on the national
courts’ duties arising from loyal co-operation can be easily extended to framework
decisions. However, this is not in itself sufficient. In order to assess whether the
principle of State liability can be extended beyond the first pillar, it is necessary to
investigate whether the constitutional specificity of the third pillar lends itself to
such a step. In particular, the Court’s first consideration in Francovich related to
the very nature of the Community legal system. The Court relied on the fact that
such a system is integrated into the national legal systems and that it is also in-
tended to grant rights to individuals. At first sight then, one could doubt whether
such a reasoning could be extended to Title VI EU, and indeed, before the ruling
in Pupino, the answer would have been negative for a number of reasons. First of
all, it is difficult to maintain that Title VI is intended to grant rights to individu-
37 ECJ 19 Nov. 1991, Case C-6/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy.
38 The Court in Pupino uses a slightly different and self-referential reasoning by focusing on the
fact that if individuals were not to be able to rely on the duty of consistent interpretation then the
Court jurisdiction in the preliminary ruling procedure would be deprived of most of its useful
effect.
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als. This conclusion is supported not only by the very exclusion of direct effect,
but also by the non-mandatory nature of the Court’s jurisdiction; by the exclusion
of the possibility to bring an action for damages for non-contractual liability of
the Union; and by the exclusion of the possibility to bring a direct action for
judicial review. Secondly, the very nature of the third pillar is different from the
Community pillar. The former lacks that level of integration into the national
legal systems that characterises the latter.
This said, following the ruling in Pupino, it seems that the distance between
the pillars, at least between the first and third, has been considerably reduced.
Pupino can be seen as a bridge allowing for the transferral of some first pillar
doctrines into the third pillar. In particular, whilst Title VI EU does not in itself
contain right-granting provisions, it is clear that framework decisions can intend
to confer individual rights (such was the case in Pupino). And it is also clear that
even if reduced, the constitutional arrangement of Title VI presupposes a certain
level of integration with the national legal systems. Thus, framework decisions are
directly binding upon member states without any need for ratification by na-
tional parliaments. And, as we have seen in the course of this article, framework
decisions are capable of producing some legal effects independently from any
implementation in national law. Recognising the liability of member states for
failure to implement framework decisions, or failure to do so correctly, seems
consistent with the constitutional system delineated by the Court in Pupino. It
would ensure the effectiveness of Union law; it would help to guarantee rights of
individuals and it would be consistent with the principle of loyal co-operation.
Furthermore, given the lack of centralised enforcement of Union law obligations,
the possibility of providing for at least some private enforcement would enhance
uniformity of Union law.
However, the more challenging problem is not whether Francovich damages
should be available, in principle, for sufficiently serious breaches of Union law.
Rather, the difficult issue relates to the assessment of the conditions to impose
such a liability. As is well-known, in order to establish member state liability for a
breach of Community law, three conditions must be met: the Community legis-
lation must intend to confer rights which are ascertainable; the breach must be
sufficiently serious; and there must be a causal link between the alleged damage
and the breach of Community law. In relation to framework decisions, all three
conditions might give rise to significant interpretative problems, especially given
the need to protect the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system, as well
as due process. For instance, the definition of the ‘intention to grant rights’ must
be interpreted restrictively so as to exclude any notion of a ‘right’ to have a con-
duct identified as a crime or an activity to be punished in a given way. Thus,
whilst the framework decision on the victims of crime at issue in Pupino might be
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interpreted as intending to confer ascertainable rights, the framework decision on
terrorism,39  which defines the constituent elements of a ‘crime’, should never be
interpreted as a right-granting instrument. However, in between the two extremes,
there might be instances in which it is difficult to identify whether the provision
does or does not grant rights.
Even more importantly, the assessment of what constitutes a sufficiently seri-
ous breach in such a sensitive context might be delicate. In this respect, consider
the Court’s ruling in Köbler.40  There, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, the Austrian Ad-
ministrative court of last resort, made a reference in relation to litigation concern-
ing whether the length of service in non-Austrian universities should be taken
into account for length of service related salary increments in Austrian universi-
ties. Whilst the case was pending in front of the ECJ, the latter Court delivered a
ruling on a similar question, which had been referred by a German court.41  As a
result the ECJ registrar enquired of the Austrian court as to whether the ruling in
the German case was sufficient or whether it would like to maintain the request
for a preliminary ruling. The Austrian court withdrew the reference; however, it
then distinguished the Austrian legislation and decided that the ruling of the ECJ
was not applicable to the facts of the proceedings before it. Since the court was
one of last resort, Mr. Köbler brought an action for Francovich damages against
Austria. The ECJ accepted that, as a matter of principle, Francovich damages are
available against a sufficiently serious breach of Community law perpetrated by a
national court of last resort. However, it then found that in the case at issue the
breach of Community law had not been sufficiently serious to give rise to dam-
ages. However, it could be argued that according to the Court’s own case-law, the
breach should have been deemed sufficiently serious: the Austrian court, being
the court of last resort, had no discretion under Article 234 EC: if following the
ruling in Schöning, it considered the matter acte éclairé, it should have applied the
ruling given by the Court; or else, if it was in any doubt as to whether the ruling
applied, then it should have not withdrawn its reference. Yet, the Court refrained
from declaring that the national court had committed a breach of Community
law, which was sufficiently serious to trigger Francovich damages. In that context,
the Court adopted a pragmatic approach that respected the sensitivities of the
national judiciaries and of the member states.
In the area of criminal law, the balance is even more delicate and the definition
of what constitutes a sufficiently serious breach is more difficult. Taking again
39 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ [2002] L 164/3.
40 ECJ 30 Sept. 2003, Case C-224/01 Köbler v. Austria.
41 ECJ 15 Jan. 1998, Case C-15/96 Kalliope Schöning-Kougebetopoulou Freie und Hansestadt
Hamburg.
22 Eleanor Spaventa EuConst 3 (2007)
Pupino as an example: would the failure of the Italian legislature to provide for a
special procedure for young victims of crime of a non-sexual nature be a suffi-
ciently serious breach of Union law?
Finally, the establishment of a link of causation might also prove difficult.
Again, in the case of Pupino: it would not be easy to determine whether the dis-
tress encountered by the children is a result of the events, of the criminal proceed-
ings or rather of the lack of protection in the gathering of the evidence. Even
though such problems might also arise in relation to first pillar Francovich cases, it
seems that the very subject-matter of the third pillar renders the establishment of
State liability both more difficult, and politically and practically more sensitive.
Pupino in its broader context: the effect of Union law
So far, we have focused on the effect of the Pupino ruling in relation to framework
decisions. What has been said about those instruments is most likely to apply also
in relation to decisions, when such decisions concern individuals. It is now neces-
sary to investigate whether the Pupino ruling is of more general application. In
particular, the question arises as to whether the duty of loyal co-operation extends
to those instruments over which the Court has no jurisdiction, i.e., third pillar
common positions and second pillar instruments.
As mentioned before, in order to establish the existence of the duty of loyal co-
operation in relation to framework decisions, the Court resorted to a (thin) tex-
tual argument as well as a more persuasive teleological one: thus it found that
Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union states that this Treaty marks a new
stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe,
and that it would be difficult for the Union to carry out its tasks effectively if the
principle of loyal co-operation were not binding in relation to police and judicial
co-operation in criminal matters. The Court then expressly referred only to Title
VI of the Treaty suggesting that the application of such a principle indeed is con-
fined to the third pillar, although it might extend to common positions. However,
it could be argued that the reasoning of the Court leads to a finding of applicabil-
ity of the principle of loyal co-operation also in relation to action adopted in the
second pillar and, where relevant, to the possibility of invoking the duty of consis-
tent interpretation in front of the national courts in relation to such matters.
The Union legal system and the constitutional principles informing such a
system must be the same regardless of the competence relied upon. The differen-
tiation between Common and Foreign Security Policy, Co-operation in Criminal
matters and Community law concerns more the subject-matter over which the
Union is exercising competence, than its constitutional principles. Thus, deci-
sions taken in the second pillar are mainly executive decisions: they are not re-
viewable by the Court of Justice, but in most systems, they would not be reviewable
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42 This is even more so the case after the Court of First Instance, 21 Sept. 2005, Case T-306/01,
Yusuf et al. v. Council and Commission, and Case T-315/01 Kadi v. Council and Commission, has
accepted the possibility to complement the passerelle clause with a 308 EC legal basis to provide for
Community competence in relation to sanctions against individuals.
43 Opinion 26 Oct. 2006, Joined Cases C-354/04 P and C-355/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía et
al. and Segi et al.
by the national courts either. The same goes for common positions in the context
of the third pillar: those are, or should be, policy instruments which define the
‘approach’ of the Union. In relation to those acts, it is not that the principle of
loyal co-operation does not (or should not) apply. It is that its application is played
out within the Council itself, and cannot be reviewed. Similarly, in many cases,
the principle of consistent interpretation would not be relevant since most of
those acts are not intended to affect the legal situation of individuals and national
courts might well not have jurisdiction. However, the fact that in many instances
these principles are not legally enforceable does not mean that the Union system
should not be perceived as unitary.
In this respect, consider the existence of the passerelle clause in Article 301 and
60 EC. Those Articles provide for Community competence to enact measures in
relation to economic sanctions pursuant to a decision taken in the field of Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy. And, as we have seen above, the Union also can
enter into international agreements in the field of co-operation in criminal mat-
ters by using common foreign and security competence together with the passarelle
clause provided in Article 38 EU. The very existence of bridges between second
and first pillar, and between third and second pillar, suggest that the Union sys-
tem should be interpreted as unitary.42
Furthermore, in some instances, the recognition of the unitary nature of the
Union system and of the binding nature of its constitutional principles is vital not
only to safeguard individual rights but also to ensure the legitimacy of Union
action by imposing a reviewable fundamental rights limit on Union law. This is
especially the case when the European Union acts by means of non-reviewable
instruments and its action directly or indirectly affects individual rights. In this
respect, it is useful to recall Advocate-General Mengozzi’s Opinion in the case of
SEGI.43  That case concerned a Common Position (an instrument not reviewable
in the Community courts), which listed individuals and organisations that the
European Union had identified as being terrorists. In examining the possible ex-
istence of a gap in judicial protection in relation to one of the organisations which
had been placed on such a list, Advocate-General Mengozzi argued in favour of a
full assertion of jurisdiction by the national courts and in favour of the national
courts’ powers to provide remedies as well as to review the legality of the Com-
mon Position. The Advocate-General found that the fact that the European courts’
jurisdiction was excluded had no bearing on the jurisdiction of the national courts
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and that indeed the principle of loyal co-operation required national courts to
effectively protect fundamental rights as general principles of Union law. Whilst it
is too early to know whether the Court will express its views on the matter regard-
less of the fact that it has no jurisdiction to hear the case, the arguments put
forward by the Advocate-General are compelling. If the Union system were to be
perceived as fragmented, then the impact of the general principles, of fundamen-
tal rights, and of judicial protection would be dependent on a purely executive
choice as to the instrument or the competence to be used. It is left to the reader to
determine whether that would be consistent with a European Union based on the
rule of law.
Conclusions
The Pupino ruling has important constitutional consequences. By transposing a
Community law doctrine to the field of co-operation in criminal matters, it acts
as a bridge between the pillars. The ruling was not unanimously well received:
concerns about loss of sovereignty in the criminal sphere and judicial law-making
might have all contributed to the criticism. This said, it should be noted that the
ruling in Pupino might serve as a much-needed judicial guarantee in a field where
significant legislative action is taking place without any significant democratic
accountability. The problem, if there is one, does not stem from the transposition
of a Community law doctrine to the field of criminal co-operation; rather, it
stems from the institutional framework in the third pillar that allows action in the
criminal sphere to be taken at the executive level and far away from the public eye.
The Constitutional Treaty would have solved this problem by eliminating the
pillar structure and subjecting action in the criminal sphere to the same judicial
and democratic guarantees that characterise the first pillar. In this sense, it is pos-
sible that the Court in Pupino simply anticipated what it had reason to believe was
going to happen in any case, once the Constitutional Treaty entered into force. It
is also possible that the Court acted out of concern that the Treaty might not enter
into force. But one also should consider that from a hermeneutic viewpoint, the
Court’s reasoning is sound, and indeed the national court took for granted that
the principle of consistent interpretation would apply also in relation to frame-
work decisions. However, as Pandora’s box, the ruling contains much more than it
might appear at first sight. In particular, it is possible that a range of constitutional
doctrines first elaborated in the context of the Community legal order might be
applicable in the context of the third pillar. This is not a bad thing if such consti-
tutional doctrines are instrumental to the protection of individual rights. The
Court might have released some evils from its box, but it surely released some
hope as well.
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